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Independent Judgment Day: The Fourth Circuit Deems Nurses

to Be Supervisors in Glenmark Associates v. NLRB
Employees in most occupations are protected by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which grants them the right to
organize and to engage in collective bargaining free from employer
interference.'
The NLRA does not, however, grant such
organizational rights and protections to supervisory employees.2 The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "the Board"), which
administers the NLRA,3 has ruled that nurses are not supervisors and
may, therefore, organize with the protection of the NLRA.4
Recently, however, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have split on the
question of how much deference should be accorded to NLRB
determinations on whether certain groups of employees are
"supervisors" under the NLRA.5 Cases involving nurses who wish to
1. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). The NLRA defines a supervisor as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.
Id. § 152(11).
Congress excluded supervisors from the protection of the NLRA to ensure that
management would have the undivided loyalty of those employees authorized to act on
behalf of management on matters that might divide management and labor. See H.R.
Rep. 80-245, at 13-17 (1947); infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text (outlining the
history of the NLRA).
3. The NLRB's main responsibilities are to conduct elections to establish whether
employees wish to be represented by a union in negotiations with their employer and to
prevent and remedy "unfair labor practices" by employers and unions that violate the
NLRA. See BERNARD D. MELTZER & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS

69 (3d ed. 1985). Although the NLRB consists of five

members, the term "Board" generally refers to the entire agency, including the office of
General Counsel and the regional offices. See id. Although the five-member Board has
the authority to hear disputes, it has no enforcement powers. Instead, enforcement lies
with the federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court. An enforcement order entered by
a court of appeals operates like an injunction; violation of such an order is punishable by
an action for contempt. See id. at 74-75.
4. See, e.g., STB Investors, Ltd., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 15,233 (Sept. 30, 1998) (granting summary judgment against an employer who
argued that its licensed practical nurses were supervisors); Youville Health Care Ctr., 326
N.L.R.B. No. 52, 1998 NLRB LEXIS 622, at *9 (Aug. 27, 1998) (adopting a finding that
nursing home charge nurses in the case were employees rather than supervisors.
5. See infra notes 156-61 (discussing the standard of review for agency decisions).
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unionize highlight this circuit split. Some circuits have deferred to
the NLRB's determination that nurses are not supervisors, while
others have overruled the Board.6 The result is that nurses who
perform virtually identical tasks are accorded a different status and
different legal protections based simply on their geographic
locations. 7 Recently, in Glenmark Associates v. NLRB,8 the Fourth
Compare Glenmark Assocs. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1998) (observing that a
thorough examination of the evidence "'should be particularly true when the Board is
determining supervisory status because of the inconsistency in the Board's application of
the statutory definition and of the factors to be used in determining such application'"
(quoting NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1982)), Caremore,
Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that, when determining
supervisory status, the NLRB "misapprehend[s] both the law and its own place in the legal
system"), and Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the Board's bias towards supervisory status lowers the standard of judicial
deference), with Passavant Retirement & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243, 246 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding that "'[b]ecause of the Board's "special competence" in the field of labor
relations, its interpretation of the Act is accorded special deference'" and noting that
"'[w]hether a [bargaining] unit is appropriate involves a large measure of informed
discretion vested in the Board and is rarely to be disturbed'" (quoting Pattern Makers'
League of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100 (1985); St. Margaret Mem'l Hosp.
v. NLRB, 991 F.2d 1146, 1152 (3d Cir. 1993))), and Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB,
121 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Because the Board has expertise 'in making the subtle
and complex distinctions between supervisors and employees, ... the normal deference
[we] give to the Board is particularly strong when it makes those determinations.'"
(quoting NLRB v. S.R.D.C., Inc., 45 F.3d 328,333 (9th Cir. 1995))).
6. Compare NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs., 176 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 1999)
(determining that nurses meet the definition of supervisor under the NLRA), Beverly
Enters., Va., v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 298 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same), and Caremore,
Inc., 129 F.3d at 371 (same), with NLRB v. GranCare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (holding that nurses are not supervisors), Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148
F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1998) (same), Beverly Enters.-Pa. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1269, 1271
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (mem.) (same), and ProvidenceAlaska Med. Ctr., 121 F.3d
at 554 (same).
7. One basic justification for unionization is that unorganized employees suffer from
an inherent bargaining disadvantage. For greater discussion of unions and the benefits of
labor organization, see ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR
LAW 98 (12th ed. 1996); MELTZER & HENDERSON, supra note 3, at 35. Health care
unions represent nurses and other workers and seek improvements regarding wages,
hours, and other employment conditions. See GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 559 (Nina Santucci Pozgar ed., 6th ed. 1996) (detailing
aspects of unions and health care organizations); James E. Eggleston, Patient Advocacy
and Consumer Protection Through Union Activism: ProtectingHealth Care Consumers,
Patientsand Workers Duringan UnprecedentedRestructuringof the Health Care Industry,
41 ST. LOUIS L.J. 925, 937-43 (1997) (advocating nurses' unions as a means to combat the
rising power of health maintenance organizations); Michael H. LeRoy et al., The Law and
Economics of Collective Bargainingfor Hospitals: An EmpiricalPublic Policy Analysis of
Bargaining Unit Determinations,9 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 15-20 (1992) (discussing nurses'
unions and the collective bargaining process); Ellen L. Luepke, White Coat, Blue Collar:
Physician Unionization and Managed Care, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 275, 278-82 (1999)
(tracing the rise of physicians' unions).
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Circuit sided with those circuits overruling the Board and held that
certain nursing home nurses are supervisors, rather than employees.
Because many nurses view their ability to unionize not only as an
important legal right, a" but also as conducive to quality patient care,"
the Glenmark decision and others like it may be important for
patients as well as for nurses. The Glenmark decision comes as the
United States faces a nursing shortage in its hospitals and nursing
homes13 and as an aging population 4 increases demand for quality
health care. 5 In light of the potential nursing shortage and the need
for improved care, the court's determination of the supervisory status
of nurses may impact nurses' power to bargain for themselves and for
patients. 6
This Note examines the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Glenmark,
the history of the NLRA, and the case law interpreting the statute. 7
The Note then reviews the Board's construction of the NLRA and
examines the approach used by different circuits in analyzing the
Board's interpretation. 8 The Note next discusses the proper
standard of review for judicial examinations of administrative
8. 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998).
9. See id. at 345.
10. See GINNY WACKER GUIDO, LEGAL ISSUES IN NURSING 264 (1997) (stating that
the American Nurses Association consistently has supported the right of nurses to bargain
collectively); NuRSE's HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ETHcS 259 (1992) (noting that the
number of unionized nurses has increased dramatically since 1974); Nurse Supervisors
Exemplify NLRB Bias, IND. EMP. L. LETrER, Oct. 1998, at 2,2 (asserting that "nurses are
frequently sympathetic to unions" and will join them when allowed by law).
11. See Eggleston, supra note 7, at 929-42 (outlining the dangers that health
maintenance organizations pose to quality patient care and the efforts of nurses to combat
such diminished care by unionizing).
12. Cf id. at 943 (explaining that unionized nurses have the ability to affect quality of
care through their collective bargaining efforts).
13. A recent survey by the American Hospital Association, American Society of
Health Care Human Resources Administration, and the American Organization of Nurse
Executives revealed an impending shortage of nurses. See Nursing Shortage: Shortfall
May Be Long Term, Am. Health Line, Mar. 23, 1999, available in LEXIS, New Library,
Medical & Health Materials Combined File. The shortage is already severe in some areas,
prompting Congress to pass the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999, a
law that allows more foreign health care workers to work in the United States. See Pub. L.
No. 106-95,113 Stat. 852.
14. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OFTHE UNITED STATES 17 (1998) (estimating that the U.S. elderly population
will more than double between 2000 and 2050).
15. See Peter Kemper & Christopher M. Murtaugh, Lifetime Use of Nursing Home
Care,324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 595 (1991) (projecting a continuing rise in nursing care use).
16. See Eggleston, supranote 7, at 943.
17. See infra notes 22-97 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 98-147 and accompanying text.
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decisions, analyzing the Fourth Circuit's approach in Glenmark and
the split among other circuits.' 9 Finally, the Note suggests that the
Supreme Court 0 or Congress2' needs to provide explicit protection
for nurses under the NLRA and to clarify how courts are to review
Board decisions.
In 1995 and 1996, the Health Care and Social Services Union was
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for the licensed
practical nurses and registered nurses who worked at Cedar Ridge
Nursing and Rehabilitation Center and Carehaven at Point Pleasant,
two nursing homes owned by Glenmark Associates in West
Virginia. 22 The Union then requested that Glenmark enter into
negotiations,' but Glenmark refused to bargain and contended that,
because the bargaining units at both Cedar Ridge and Point Pleasant
contained employees who fit the NLRA's definition of "supervisor,"
the bargaining units were organized illegally.2 4 After Glenmark
19. See infra notes 148-78 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
22. The nursing homes are located in Sissonville and Point Pleasant, West Virginia.
See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 335. The Union sought to represent 22 licensed practical nurses
(LPNs) at Cedar Ridge and 10 LPNs and 2 registered nurses (RNs) at Point Pleasant. See
id. at 336, 337. At Cedar Ridge, 21 nurses voted. See id. at 336. Of those nurses, 11 voted
in favor of the union representation, and 10 voted against it, giving the Union a simple
majority, and thus a sufficient number of votes to obtain certification as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative for the bargaining unit of nurses. See id. At Point
Pleasant, 9 of the 11 nurses approved representation, so the Union was certified there as
well. See id. at 337.
23. Under the NLRA, employers have an enforceable duty to bargain with validly
selected union representatives chosen by a majority of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994). Such representatives have the exclusive
right to bargain on behalf of all the members of the unit. See id. Ain employer is guilty of
unfair labor practices if it refuses to bargain with the representative of a legally formed
union. See id. § 158(a)(1), (5).
24. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 335. Glenmark's refusal to negotiate served as a
vehicle for the nursing home to obtain judicial review of the Union's representation of the
nurses. Courts only may review the Board's representation determinations indirectly. See
AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409-11 (1940) (holding that NLRB representation
determinations are not "final orders" and are thus not judicially reviewable). During a
representation determination, the NLRB's regional director conducts a hearing to
establish that a potential bargaining unit does not contain employees excluded from the
protection of the NLRA. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(a) (1998); MELTZER & HENDERSON,
supra note 3, at 433-34. The employer may dispute the eligibility of the employees'
protected status at this time. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(a); MELTZER & HENDERSON, supra
note 3, at 433-34. If the regional director then finds the bargaining unit to be appropriate,
the director will order an election for certification of a bargaining unit. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.67(b); MELTZER & HENDERSON, supra note 3, at 433-34. A simple majority in the
representation vote is sufficient to certify the bargaining unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3);
Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 336. To obtain judicial review of union representation
determinations, an employer generally will decline to bargain with the union certified by
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refused to bargain, the Union filed charges with the NLRB, alleging
unfair labor practices2
The Board found that the bargaining units had been formed
legally at the two nursing homes 6 and disagreed with Glenmark's
contention that the licensed practical nurses (LPNs) were
supervisors.'
Instead, the Board found that the LPNs did not
the Board as the unit's exclusive bargaining representative. See, e.g., B B & L, Inc. v.
NLRB, 52 F.3d 366, 369 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (noting that refusing to bargain
is the standard procedure for employers who wish to challenge a certification order). The
union will charge the employer with violating the NLRA by refusing to bargain with a
certified bargaining representative. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); MELTZER & HENDERSON,
supra note 3, at 433. After an unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board will order the
recalcitrant employer to bargain. The employer is then free to seek court review of the
bargaining order, including an examination of the initial representation determination.
See id. at 433-34.
25. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 337.
26. See id. During an unfair labor practice proceeding, a Board regulation prevents
the relitigation of any issue that was or could have been raised in the representation
proceeding. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(f). Because the Board regulations prevent relitigation
of status determinations absent special circumstances, and because the Board found that
Glenmark offered no new evidence or special circumstances as to this issue, the Board
found a reexamination of the initial determination to be unwarranted. See Glenmark
Assocs., 322 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1996 NLRB LEXIS 753, at *2-3 (Nov. 15, 1996); Glenmark
Assocs., 322 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 1996 NLRB LEXIS 638, at *2-3 (Sept. 20, 1996). Thus, the
Board granted summary judgment against Glenmark. See Glenmark Assocs., 1996 NLRB
LEXIS 638, at *3; Glenmark Assocs., 1996 NLRB LEXIS 753, at *3.
27. Although the bargaining unit at Point Pleasant also contained a few registered
nurses, the status of the LPNs was at the heart of the dispute. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at
340,343. The nursing staffs at Cedar Ridge and Point Pleasant were organized in a typical
nursing home hierarchy: one Director of Nursing, one assistant administrator, a small
number of registered nurses (three full-time, one part-time at Cedar Ridge, two at Point
Pleasant), some licensed practical nurses (22 at Cedar Ridge, 10 at Point Pleasant), and a
large number of certified nursing aides (CNAs) (about 60 at Cedar Ridge and up to 40 at
Point Pleasant). See id. at 335-36; Jonathan Edward Motley, Note, Grandmothers and
Teamsters: How the NLRB's New Approach to the Supervisory Status of Charge Nurses
Ignores the Reality of the Nursing Home, 73 IND. L.J. 711, 717-18 (1998) (outlining the
standard structure of nursing care facilities).
A registered nurse must complete a four- or five-year baccalaureate program at a
college or university, graduating with a bachelor of science degree. See PDR MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1232 (Marjory Spraycar ed., 1995); see also LEXIKON: DICTIONARY OF
HEALTH CARE TERMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ACRONYMS FOR THE ERA OF REFORM

680 (Margaret R. O'Leary et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter LEXIKON] (describing
qualifications and responsibilities of registered nurses). After obtaining the necessary
training, the nursing school graduate must pass the National Council Licensure
Examination. See LEXIKON, supra, at 515, 680. The nurse is then licensed by the state as
a registered nurse. See LEXIKON, supra, at 680; PDR MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra, at
1232.
Licensed practical nurses are professional nurses licensed to administer patient
care under the supervision of a doctor or a registered nurse. See PDR MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra, at 1231. LPNs usually study practical nursing and direct patient care
for one to two years at an accredited school of practical nursing. Upon graduating, the
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exercise independent judgment as required by the NLRA and were

simply highly skilled professionals'
whose incidental job
requirements included sharing knowledge and expertise with lesser
skilled coworkers through direction and task assignment.29
The Board acknowledged that the LPNs' duties required them to30
perform one or more of the statute's enumerated supervisory tasks,

but pointed to several other aspects of their duties in concluding that
the LPNs did not exercise independent judgment when assigning

tasks to or imposing discipline upon certified nursing assistants
(CNAs).3 1 First, the Board contended that, rather than utilizing their
own critical faculty, the LPNs were required to follow routine
procedures in assigning the CNAs various tasks. 32 The Board
reasoned that such institutional procedures eliminated the necessity

of exercising independent judgment.

Second, any decisions

requiring independent judgment during an LPN's shift could be made

by the registered nurse on call. 34 The LPNs also did not have the
ultimate authority to discipline CNAs; rather, the LPNs could only
file reports recommending appropriate action with the Director of

student must then pass a state board examination to be licensed as an LPN. See id.
Certified nursing aides have minimal training and assist in the most basic patient
care responsibilities, such as bathing and dressing patients, changing their linens, and
brushing their hair and teeth. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 336.
28. Professional employees are specifically protected under the NLRA, which defines
"professional employee" as any employee who is engaged in intellectual work that
demands both discretion and judgment in its performance and some type of specialized
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital. See 29
U.S.C. § 152(12). The line between supervisors and professional employees has not been
an easy one for the courts to draw. See David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded
Managersfrom Covered ProfessionalsUnder the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 180205 (1989) (outlining the difficulties in designating an employee as a professional); infra
notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between the two categories).
29. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 340.
30. See id. at 341. The nurses both assigned work and disciplined employees, which
are actions covered by the statutory language. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11); Glenmark, 147
F.3d at 340; supranote 2 (quoting the statute).
31. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 341-44.
32. See id. at 341-42; supra note 27 (defining CNAs' duties). For instance, at Cedar
Ridge, if an LPN needed to change a CNA's assigned duties for any reason, the LPN had
to first ask for volunteers and then fill the slot according to CNA seniority. See Glenmark,
147 F.3d at 346 (Jones, J., dissenting). LPNs were authorized to permit a CNA to leave
work early, but they were required to inform the supervising RN of that decision. See id.
(Jones, J., dissenting). Furthermore, at Point Pleasant, because the CNAs were unionized,
a collective bargaining agreement dictated many aspects of calling in off-duty aides and of
discipline procedures. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
33. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 340.
34. See id. at 341. The Board did not present any evidence, however, that any of the
Cedar Ridge LPNs actually called the RNs for consultation. See id.
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Nursing, who then made the final decision to implement discipline.35
Third, the Board classified verbal reprimands by the LPNs as
instruction rather than discipline.36 Because the command structure
and procedures limited LPNs' ability to exercise discretion, the
Board argued that they did not apply independent judgment as
envisioned by the NLRA. 37 Accordingly, the Board determined that
Glenmark's failure to negotiate was an unfair labor practice. When
the Board ordered the nursing home back to the bargaining table,
Glenmark appealed, claiming that the Board was mistaken in
characterizing the LPNs as non-supervisors.39
Upon analyzing the nursing homes' physical facilities, staffs, job
descriptions, shift schedules, and the nature of the duties performed
by the LPNs at both Point Pleasant and Cedar Ridge, 0 the Fourth
35. See id. at 342-44.
36. See id. at 342. This conclusion contradicted the testimony by the Cedar Ridge
Director of Nursing, who confirmed that LPNs discipline CNAs without prior approval
from RNs. See id. at 342 n.13. The Assistant Director of Nursing also testified that an
LPN had suspended a CNA on her own authority when she discovered that the CNA had
mistreated a resident. See id. at 343.
37. See id. at 342.
38. See Glenmark Assocs., 322 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1996 NLRB LEXIS 753, at *4-5
(Nov. 15, 1996); Glenmark Assocs., 322 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 1996 NLRB LEXIS 638, at *4-5
(Sept. 20,1996).
39. See Glenmark,147 F.3d at 337.
40. At Cedar Ridge, the RNs operated on a separate 12-hour shift schedule and
served as charge nurses when they were on the floor. See id at 335. The charge nurse was
any staff nurse (RN or LPN) who was "in charge" of the facility during a certain shift. See
id. at 335 n.2. The charge nurse's duty consisted primarily of coordinating patient care
within the assigned area of her department. See id. For example, a charge nurse might
have spent time assessing patients' needs, monitoring attendance, insuring adequate
personnel, and monitoring and evaluating staff nurses' performances. See id. at 335 n.2,
336. Charge nurses supervised all of the other nurses during their shifts. See id. at 344.
When there was no RN coverage, however, the senior LPN on the shift took over the
charge nurse's responsibilities. See id. at 335. Any LPN employed at the facility could
potentially serve as the charge nurse. See id. This potential for charge nurse status was
particularly important to the court in its analysis of LPN supervisory capacity. See infra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
LPNs' duties primarily related to direct patient care, but also included managing
CNAs in certain circumstances. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 336. LPNs could reassign or
call in CNAs when a staff shortfall occurred. See id. If a CNA made a special scheduling
request during a shift, the LPN floor nurse had the authority to approve or disapprove that
request. See id. LPNs were also involved in the discipline of aides, including counseling
the CNAs, filing "verbal correction notices" with the Director of Nursing, and, for serious
infractions, immediately suspending CNAs. Id. The duties of CNAs at Cedar Ridge
primarily involved more basic personal hygiene-oriented duties than did the LPNs'
responsibilities. See id. For example, CNAs turned, bathed, dressed, brushed the teeth of,
and changed the linens and clothing for patients. See id.
At Point Pleasant, the LPNs performed essentially identical tasks to those at
Cedar Ridge. See id. at 336-37. Because none of the administrative staff was on call or
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Circuit reversed the Board's decision.4

would

have

sustained

the

Board's

515

The court explained that it

determination

if

that

determination had been reasonable and consistent with the NLRA,
but noted that the Board had displayed "'manifest
...
inconsistency' " in the past when determining supervisory status. 42

Because of this inconsistency, the court concluded that it should
conduct a thorough examination of the evidence in the case to
evaluate the Board's conclusions.4 3

The court first outlined the three-prong test for determining44

whether an employee qualifies as a supervisor under the NLRA.

First, an employee must have the authority to perform at least one of
twelve enumerated tasks.45 Second, these tasks must promote the
interests of the employer,' and third, an employee must use
"independent judgment" while exercising such authority.47 The
Fourth Circuit focused its analysis on the third criterion, rejecting the
Board's contention that the Glenmark nurses' duties of assigning and
disciplining lower employees were merely incidental and did not

carried beepers, the Point Pleasant charge nurses did not receive direction when
administrators were off-site and were the most senior employees at the nursing home
during the evenings and weekends. See id.
41. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 333,345. Judge Williams wrote the majority opinion in
which Judge Niemeyer joined. See id. at 334. Judge Jones, a United States District Judge
for the Western District of Virginia who was sitting by designation, wrote a dissenting
opinion. See id. at 345-47 (Jones, J., dissenting); infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text
(discussing the dissent).
42. Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 338 (quoting NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d
1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1982)). The Fourth Circuit has long been suspicious of the Board's
motives in determining supervisory status and openly doubtful of the Board's ability to
remain appropriately neutral. See id. at 339-40 n.8. In 1982, the Fourth Circuit stated that
a thorough examination of the evidence is particularly necessary in cases in which the
Board decides supervisory status, citing one commentator who accused the Board of
implementing a policy biased in favor of whatever definition of supervisor would widen
the coverage of the NLRA. See St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d at 1067 (quoting Note,
The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explanationof Inconsistent Results, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1713, 1713-14, 1721 (1981) [hereinafter The NLRB and Supervisory Status]).
43. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 338.
44. See id.
45. See id. Examples of such tasks include the authority to assign, discipline, or
responsibly direct other employees, or effectively to recommend such action. See 29
U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994); supra note 2 (quoting the statute). The court noted that whether
the employee actually exercised the authority was irrelevant, as long as the authority had
been delegated properly. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 338.
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511
U.S. 571, 583-84 (1994) (holding that a nurse's patient care satisfies the "in the interest of
the employer" requirement of the NLRA); see also infra notes 98-133 and accompanying
text (discussing this requirement).
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11); Glenmark,147 F.3d at 339.
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require independent judgment. 8
The court held instead that the nurses had considerable
discretion to exercise management prerogatives 49 and chided the
Board for "fail[ing] to appreciate the distinction between using skill
and professional judgment to perform a complex job and using
related skills and judgment to manage others. ' 50 The court held that
the plain language of the NLRA establishes that nurses share in the
power of management by making critical supervisory decisions that
substantially affect lower ranking employees.5 Specifically, the court
refuted the Board's characterization of LPNs as non-supervisors in
three areas: their ability to assign work, their power to discipline,
and the role of charge nurses.52
First, the court disagreed with the Board's assessment that an
LPN's ability to assign work was merely incidental to her other duties
and cited many instances of LPNs' direction and control of
employees.5 3 For example, the Glenmark LPNs were often
responsible for maintaining appropriate staff levels within the nursing
home,' a task that required an LPN to decide whether to call
additional CNAs into work, to alter hallway assignments and break
schedules, or to allow CNAs to leave work early. 5 Such authority,
the court maintained, "rises above the mere incidental direction of
assistants. 56 Accordingly, the court rejected the Board's evaluation
of these tasks as routine, noting that an established procedure does
not abdicate the necessity for thought.57 Individual patients may have
specialized health risks or physical limitations to which a particular
CNA with unique skills is better suited to respond.5 8 For example, a
seasoned CNA would be better assigned to more vulnerable patients
48. See Glenmark,147 F.3d at 340.
49. See id. at 340.

50. Id. The court cited language from Health Care as support for its contention that
there is "a distinction between authority arising from professional knowledge and
authority encompassing front-line management prerogatives." Id. at 340 (quoting NLRB
v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 583 (1994)); infra notes 115-33
and accompanying text (discussing Health Care).
51. See id. For a discussion of the court's examination of the plain meaning of the
statute, see infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (questioning the applicability of the
plain meaning approach to a statutory phrase when the circuits substantially disagree as to
its interpretation).
52. See Glenmark,147 F.3d at 341-45.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 340.
55. See id. at 341.
56. Id.

57. See id.
58. See id. at 342.
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than an inexperienced CNA who is new to the job. Because staffing
decisions require an individualized analysis of patients' needs and
particular staff members' skills, the court held that independent
judgment by the LPNs is inseparable from their duties, routine or
otherwise. 59
The court also rejected the Board's conclusion that the LPNs'

ability to discipline lower-level employees was not an indication of
supervisory status. 60 Observing that the NLRA demands only that a
supervisor have the ability "effectively to recommend" discipline, 6'

the court stated that the relevant approach would be to consider the
LPNs' ability to recommend discipline, rather than to focus on their
ultimate authority to implement punishment. 62 The court concluded
that the LPNs did have sufficient authority "effectively to
recommend" discipline, so that despite their lack of ultimate
authority, they satisfied this requirement for supervisory status.63
The court reserved its harshest critique of the Board's ruling for
the final line of analysis, the interpretation of the role of charge
nurses.64 The Glenmark LPNs often function as charge nurses.65

59. See id. The court noted that by finding that LPNs use independent judgment to
assign tasks, it need go no further in its analysis. See id. In other words, the court held
that a finding that an employee has one of the 12 listed duties is enough to confer
supervisory status. See id.
60. See id., 147 F.3d at 342-44.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994); supra note 2 (quoting the statute).
62. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 342 (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 683
n.17 (1980)). The Directors of Nursing at both Glenmark facilities testified that they
depended upon the input of the LPNs, who are often the only witnesses to any
misbehavior by CNAs. See id. at 343. CNAs, who often lack training and are minimally
regulated, comprise the majority of nursing personnel at most nursing homes. See Motley,
supra note 27, at 717. Moreover, they are the lowest paid and most transient of any
employee in the average nursing home. See id. at 740. Finally, because many nursing
home residents suffer from some form of dementia, they are not alert, making it easy for
CNAs to take advantage of them. See id. at 741-42 (arguing that such abuse is easier to
prevent when charge nurses are aligned with management). Dishonest CNAs might be
tempted to supplement their low incomes by stealing from unsuspecting and vulnerable
residents. Members of Congress specifically recognized this problem when they recently
proposed the Patient Abuse Prevention Act, which would create a national registry for
nursing home employees and require nursing homes to perform criminal background
checks. See S. 1445, 106th Cong. (1999) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/1:106-1445).
Cedar Ridge and Point Pleasant, like many nursing homes, rely upon LPN charge
nurses to control such problems. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 343-44. The LPNs have the
authority to suspend any CNA for serious breaches of patient care protocol. See id. At
Cedar Ridge, an LPN had in fact suspended a CNA for rough treatment of a patient. See
id.
63. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 342-44.
64. See id. at 344-45; supranote 40 (describing the duties of charge nurses).
65. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 341-42.
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During evenings and weekends, charge nurses are the highest ranking
employees on site.66 The court questioned how a nursing home could
operate effectively for two-thirds of the week with no one at the
facility exercising independent judgment. 67 After noting that the
charge nurses possess a vested managerial authority even if they do
not frequently exercise such power, the court held that whether
charge nurses actually performed any additional duties was
immaterial to determining supervisory status. 68

Citing Fourth Circuit case law that had already determined a
charge nurse at a nursing home to be a supervisor,69 the court viewed
the Board's refusal to follow this precedent as another example of the
Board's consistent policy push for an expansive interpretation of the
NLRA, despite judicial rejection of such a broad reading.70 Warning
that the Board's adherence to the expansive reading strained its
credibility with the Fourth Circuit, the court advised the Board to reevaluate its "single-minded pursuit of its policy goals. 71 Having
asserted its supervisory authority over the Board, the court
concluded that the Board proffered little evidence to support its
interpretation of "independent judgment" and, therefore, had acted
irrationally in its interpretation of the NLRA. 72 Furthermore, the
66. See id. The Board had deemed the LPNs' charge nurse duties insignificant
because such a station held little extra responsibility. See id. at 344. This conclusion, the
court asserted, contradicted both the evidence and circuit precedent. See id.
67. See id. at 344-45.
68. See id. at 344 ("Being designated 'charge nurse' is more significant than acquiring
a mere title, it is acceding to full responsibility for the nursing home.").
69. See id. (citing NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982)). In
St. Mary's Home, Inc., the court repeatedly emphasized the importance of the designation
"charge nurse" at a nursing home that operated on a 24-hour schedule because the charge
nurse is often the highest ranking official present at the home. 690 F.2d at 1067.
70. See Glenmark,147 F.3d at 345 (stating that "the Board once again has declined to
follow our Circuit's law"). The Board's refusal to acquiesce to a court of appeals decision
and the subsequent judicial criticism is not unusual, however. See Edward Silver & Joan
McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at the Crossroads,56 FORDHAM L. REV.181,
199 (1987) (describing the friction between the circuits and the Board over the Board's
tendency to disregard circuit precedent). The Board is responsible for uniform
administration of the NLRA and, thus, often adheres to its own interpretation of the Act
despite the rejection of its position by some circuits. See id. at 203.
71. Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 340 n.8. The court described the NLRB's position as "an
end run around an unfavorable Supreme Court decision in order to promote policies of
broadening the coverage of the Act, maximizing the number of unions certified, and
increasing the number of unfair labor practice findings it makes rather than explicate a
well-reasoned interpretation of the NLRA." Id. at 339 n.8.
72. See id. at 345. Thus, the court tacitly acknowledged the doctrine announced by
the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), which instructs appellate courts to uphold agency decisions
interpreting ambiguous statutory language unless the interpretations are irrational. For
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court held that the licensed practical nurses and registered nurses
who worked at the Glenmark nursing homes exercised independent
judgment in the performance of their duties and, as such, qualified as
supervisors under the NLRA.73 Their supervisory status disqualified
the RNs and LPNs from organizing under the Act, and, thus,
Glenmark had not engaged in an unfair labor practice when it
refused to deal with bargaining units that included such nurses.74
In dissent, Judge Jones contended that the record contained
abundant evidence to support the Board's decision. 75 He noted the
difficulty of determining the supervisory status of professional
employees who regularly exercise discretion in their daily tasks.76
According to Judge Jones, however, the degree of discretion
exercised by such professionals, rather than inherent authority, is
determinative.77 That is, if an employee's discretion is constrained
substantially by superiors, then any application of managerial power
is routine and necessarily devoid of independent judgment within the
meaning of the NLRA. 8 Whether an employee's discretion is
substantially constrained is a fact-specific determination.
Judge Jones argued that the Glenmark nurses were limited to
"set options" in their ability to assign and discipline CNAs and,
therefore, should be considered employees.79 Judge Jones disagreed
with the ruling that LPNs retained ultimate authority over the facility
during their shifts as charge nurses, arguing instead that this
designation remained with the on-call nurse at all times.80 To
illustrate the distinction, he observed that a" 'night watchman is not
a supervisor just because he is the only person on the premises at
greater discussion of the standard of review and Chevron's implications, see infra notes
156-68 and accompanying text.
73. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 345.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 345-47 (Jones, J., dissenting).
76. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the circuit split over the issue of
independint judgment and professional employees).
77. See id. at 346 (Jones, J., dissenting) (pointing to similar distinctions made by the
D.C. and Sixth Circuits as authority for his argument).
78. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 346-47 (Jones, J., dissenting). For example, Judge Jones pointed out
that if a vacancy in a work shift occurred, the LPNs are required to ask for volunteers,
then to fill the spot according to CNA seniority. See id. at 346 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Regarding the LPNs' ability to discipline, Judge Jones noted that the LPNs have no power
to either fire a CNA or compel specific discipline on the basis of a verbal correction

notice. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 347 (Jones, J., dissenting). On-call nurses are registered nurses who are
not physically present at the nursing home, but who may be "called in" to the facility in
case of an emergency. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
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night, and if there were several watchmen it would not follow that at

least one was a supervisor.' "81 Judge Jones then concluded that the
nurses were substantially constrained in their discretion and,
therefore, did not exercise independent judgment within the meaning
of the Act. 2

The court's decision in Glenmark is one of the latest to highlight
the tension between the circuits and the Board regarding supervisory
83
status of employees under the National Labor Relations Act.
Enacted in 1935, the NLRA originally did not exempt supervisory
employees from its coverage.' As a result, supervisory employees
could organize as part of bargaining units and negotiate with their
employers.85 Employers complained that this framework produced
an imbalance between labor and management, but the Supreme
Court refused to carve out a supervisory exception from the Act's
broad coverage. 86 In Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 87 the Court

determined that acts within the scope of employment or for the
authorized business of the employer are "in the interest of the
employer." s The Court stated that "it is for Congress, not for us, to
create exceptions or qualifications at odds with [the Act's] plain

81. Id. at 347 (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461,
1467 (7th Cir. 1983)).
82. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).

83. Compare NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs., 176 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 1999)
(concluding that LPN charge nurses are supervisors under the NLRA), Beverly Enters.,
Va. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 298 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding LPNs to be
supervisors), and Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 370-71 (6th Cir. 1997)
(determining that nursing home LPNs meet the definition of supervisor under the
NLRA), with NLRB v. GranCare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(holding that nursing home LPNs are not supervisors under the NLRA), Beverly Enters.
v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that charge nurses are not
supervisors), Beverly Enters.-Pa. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1269, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (mem.) (enforcing the Board's order determining that LPNs are not supervisors),
and Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that charge nurses are not statutory supervisors).
84. See National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1994)). For in-depth discussions of the
NLRA and its history, see HARRY A. MILLIs, FROM THE WAGNER Acr TO TAFTHARTLEY:

A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS

30-75

(1950), and George Feldman, Workplace Power and Collective Activity: The Supervisory
and ManagerialExclusions in Labor Law, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 525, 534-40 (1995) (relating

Congress's passage of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, which are the foundation of the
NLRA).
85. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,573 (1994).
86. See id. at 573; Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485,490 (1947).
87. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
88. Id. at 488-89.
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terms."8 9

Congress responded by passing the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947,10 which amended the NLRA to state that the
term "employee... shall not include... any individual employed as a
supervisor." 91 As amended, the NLRA's section 2(11) defines
"supervisor" according to a three-prong test. First, an individual
must possess the authority to perform at least one enumerated
supervisory task: hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, discipline, responsibly direct other
employees or adjust their grievances, or "effectively to recommend"
such action. 92 Second, the individual must carry out these activities
"in the interest of the employer."93 Finally, the exercise of such
authority must require the use of "independent judgment."'94
This definition of supervisor is in tension with section 2(12) of
the NLRA, which specifically protects "professional" employees by
allowing them to unionize. 95 The Act defines professionals as those
employees whose work is "predominantly intellectual and varied in
character," involves "the consistent exercise of discretion and
judgment," and requires advanced knowledge "acquired by a
prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in
an institution of higher learning or a hospital. '96 Professional
employees may incidentally direct other employees in carrying out
daily work, but as long as this direction is limited and does not
encompass supervisory authority under the NLRA, professionals will
not be classified as supervisors and will be protected by the NLRA as
employees. 97
Ironically then, non-supervisory professional
89. Id. at 490. A more detailed discussion of Packardcan be found in Feldman, supra
note 84, at 534-40.
90. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994)).
91. Id. § 14, 61 Stat. at 151 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994)). The Senate
explained that the only employees to be excluded are those regarded as foremen and not
workers with minor supervisory duties, emphasizing that only employees vested with
genuine management prerogatives should be considered supervisors. See S. REP. No. 80105, at 4 (1947).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. See id. § 152(12); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980) (holding that
university faculty members are supervisors under section 2(11) despite the "tension
between the Act's exclusion of managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals");
Rabban, supra note 28, at 1798-99 (analyzing the tension between the statutory definitions
of "supervisor" and "professional" under the Act).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12).
97. See Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 681-82 (noting that professionals may be exempted
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employees, who typically enjoy strong bargaining positions with
employers, may unionize, while employees with less workplace power
but some supervisory duties may not.
Because many nursing jobs possess both supervisory and
professional characteristics, this distinction is problematic when
determining whether nurses can unionize. 8 In order to gain union

protection for nurses, the National Labor Relations Board originally
attempted to reconcile sections 2(11) and 2(12) by using an analysis
unique to the nursing industry.9 9 In analyzing cases assessing whether
charge nurses are supervisors, the Board focused on the NLRA's

phrase "in the interest of the employer." 00 In what came to be
known as the "patient care analysis," the NLRB reasoned that the
supervisory duties performed by charge nurses were discharged in the
interest of the patient rather than in the interest of the employer. 1 1
The Board deemed a nurse's authority to perform the enumerated
supervisory activities to be an exercise of professional judgment and
incidental to the nurse's primary obligation of patient care.'02 In
addition to the Board's legal interpretation of the Act, the Board had
strong policy reasons for advocating this position. The Board was
concerned that the similarities between professional duties and
supervisory activities might result in decreased protection for
professionals.0 3 Moreover, because of nurses' professional and
from coverage of the Act if they are supervisors).
98. Registered nurses generally qualify as professionals, while licensed practical
nurses do not. See St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 220 N.L.R.B. 325, 325 (1975) (granting
professional status to graduate nurses and senior nursing assistants who have graduated
but not yet passed the required registration examination for registered nurses);
Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 218 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1266-67 (1975) (granting registered nurses
professional status, but denying the same to LPNs); Pikeville Investors, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B.
425, 425-26 (1973) (finding that LPNs lack the academic instruction necessary for
professional status).
99. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 574 (1994)
("In cases involving nurses, the Board admits that it has interpreted the statutory phrase in
a unique manner.").
100. See, e.g., Beverly Enters.-Ohio, 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493-94 (1993) (finding that the
nurse's role in assigning, directing, and disciplining aides was an exercise of professional
judgment in the interests of patient care rather than an exercise of supervisory authority in
the interest of the employer). But see Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1552
(6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the Board's argument that the nursing home staff worked in the
interest of the patients, rather than in the interests of the employer).
101. See Beverly Enters.-Ohio, 313 N.L.R.B. at 493-94; Roger King, Where Have All
the Supervisors Gone?-The Board's Misdiagnosisof Health Care & Retirement Corp., 13
LAB. L. 343, 344-46 (1997) (tracing the history of the patient care analysis).
102. See Beverly Enters.-Ohio,313 N.L.R.B. at 494.
103. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 581 (noting the Board's argument that an overbroad
interpretation of the Act should not be allowed to nullify Congress's intended protection
for professional employees).

2000]

NURSES' SUPERVISORY STATUS

ethical commitments to their patients, the Board believed that the
Act's original purpose of avoiding divided loyalties between labor
and management was not in question."°4 In light of its interpretation
of the Act and its underlying policy concerns, the Board granted
charge nurses specific protection under the Act as non-supervisory
professionals. 10 5
The Board's interpretation of the phrase "in the interest of the
employer"'1 6 had mixed success when reviewed by the federal circuit
courts1

7

The Sixth Circuit rejected the Board's test as inconsistent

with the NLRA, 1t echoing the Supreme Court's holding in Packard
that Congress, not the judicial or executive branches, is responsible
for carving out an exception for the health field."9 The Second," 0
Seventh,"' and Eighth Circuits," in contrast, upheld the Board's
determination, emphasizing judicial deference to administrative
agencies"' and the routine nature of the nurses' supervisory duties."4
The Supreme Court resolved the dispute over the Board's
approach to supervisory status for nurses in NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp. of America."' In a five-to-four decision," 6 the
104. See id. at 580-81 (noting the Board's confidence in its assertion that, because
divided loyalties were not a problem with nurses, any managerial exclusion was

unnecessary).
105. See id.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
107. Compare Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 626,63031 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding LPNs to be protected under the Act), NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.,
705 F.2d 1461, 1468 (7th Cir. 1983) (same), and Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB,
623 F.2d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1980) (same), with Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548,
1552-53 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the NLRA does not protect charge nurses because
they qualify as supervisors).
108. See Beverly Cal. Corp., 970 F.2d at 1552 (noting that simply because nursing home
personnel are directed to ensure "quality care" for the patients does not disqualify such
direction as being "in the interest of the employer"); see also NLRB v. Beacon Light
Christian Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that there is no
support for the Board's patient care exception in the Taft-Hartley Act or its legislative
history).
109. See Beverly Cal. Corp., 970 F.2d at 1556.
110. See MisericordiaHosp. Med. Ctr., 623 F.2d at 816.
111. See Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d at 1468.
112. See Waverly-CedarFalls Health Care Ctr., Inc., 933 F.2d at 630-31.
113. Courts must defer to administrative agency interpretations of vague statutory
language if they are "permissible constructions." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); infra notes 156-68 and
accompanying text (discussing Chevron and its implications in Glenmark).
114. See Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr., Inc., 933 F.2d at 629-30.
115. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
116. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined. See id. at 572; id. at 584
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Court invalidated the Board's patient care analysis, stating that it

created a "false dichotomy" between the interest of the employer and
the interests of the patient that was contrary to the language and
spirit of the NLRA." 7 Given that patient care is the business of a
nursing home, the Court reasoned that "attending to the needs of
nursing home patients, who are the employer's customers, is in the

interest of the employer.""' 8 The Court explained that Packard's
broad definition of the phrase "in the interest of the employer"
includes actions of all employees acting within the scope of
employment."19 According to the Court, the plain meaning of the
NLRA does not support the dichotomy created by the Board's

patient care analysis.2 0 Although the Court agreed that the Board
should be given "ample room" to interpret such ambiguous phrases

from the Act as "responsibly to direct" and "independent judgment,"
it reminded the Board that ambiguity elsewhere in the Act was
irrelevant because the Board had relied exclusively upon the "in the
interest of the employer" language as a basis for finding that nurses

are covered by the NLRA.'2 ' Because the Court found the "in the
interest of the employer" language to be unambiguous, it refused to
defer to the Board's "distorted" interpretation of the statute.12

The Health Care Court also rejected each of the Board's policy
arguments for upholding the patient care approach.12'

The Board

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 577. For greater discussion of the Health Care decision, see King, supra note
101, at 344-52 (criticizing the Board's approach to supervisory status in Health Care);
Colleen A. Manning, 1995-96 Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, Status of
ChargeNurses as "Supervisors" Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 38 B.C. L. REV.
335, 345 (1997) (arguing that Health Care does not necessarily end protection for nurses);
J.P. Nusbaum, Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation. Nurses as
Supervisors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 74 OR. L. REV. 1087, 1096-1104
(1995) (analyzing the implications of the Court's decision); Joseph A. Stegbauer, Note,
Form over Function: The Supreme Court Eviscerates the National Labor Relations Act's
Protection of Professionals: NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of
America, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994), 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1979, 2003-05 (1995) (arguing that the
Court's decision in Health Care has the potential to nullify the NLRA's protection of
professionals); R. Jason Straight, Note, Who's the Boss?: Charge Nurses and "Independent
Judgment" After National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement
Corporation of America, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1927, 1954 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme
Court failed to recognize the subtle distinction between acting as a professional and acting
as a supervisor).
118. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 577.
119. See id. at 578; see also supra text accompanying notes 87-88 (discussing Packard's
definition of "in the interest of the employer").
120. See Health Care,511 U.S. at 578-79.
121. Id. at 579.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 580-82.
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had posited that the underlying policy reason for excluding
supervisors from the Act-the danger that supervisors will have
conflicting loyalties-did not exist in patient care industries. 124 The
Court disagreed, stating that the statute was clear and did not allow
for the creation of "legal categories inconsistent with its meaning.""
The Court also hypothesized that the danger of divided loyalties
could exist in patient care industries.126 Finally, the Court addressed
the statutory overlap between supervisors and professionals.2 The
Board had argued that, because incidental supervisory powers are
often inherent in professional duties, professionals were particularly
susceptible to supervisory classification, thereby losing their intended
protection under the Act. 28 The Court recognized the tension, but
Board could not resolve it by "distorting the statutory
stated that the
1 29
language.'
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Board's
attempt to distinguish protected professionals who incidentally direct
other employees from excluded supervisors who exercise key
managerial authority was rational and consistent with the Act. 3 °
Justice Ginsburg reminded the Court of its earlier approval of the
Board's inclusion of those employees whose discretion is limited to
"'routine discharge of professional duties' " under the NLRA, even
if such inclusion may entail some divided loyalties.' 31 Noting that the
Board had employed this distinction to resolve numerous other cases
involving the supervisory status of other professional workers, such
as doctors, lawyers, and engineers, 32 Justice Ginsburg concluded that
the Health Care decision would provide little protection for
33
professionals under the Act.
124. See id. at 580-81. The Board argued that nurses whose supervisory authority
concerns patient care would not pose the threat of divided loyalty that the supervisor
exception was designed to avoid. See id. at 580.
125. Id. at 580.
126. See id. at 580-81. The Court was concerned that the owners of a health care
facility might at times be forced to insist on the "undivided loyalty" of their nurses. Id. at
581.
127. See id. at 582-84.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 581. The Court did point out, however, that the Board may recognize a
difference between "authority arising from professional knowledge and authority
encompassing front-line management prerogatives." Id. at 583. As long as such a finding
does not result from manipulation of statutory language, it will be valid. See id.
130. See id. at 586 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672, 690 (1980)).
132. See id. at 591-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (positing that, if anyone who may use
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While the health care and legal communities were discussing the
impact of Health Care on the organizational rights of nurses,1 1 the
Board developed a new interpretation of section 2(11) to allow
nurses continued protection under the Act.135 The Board abandoned
its focus on whether nurses' actions were "in the interests of their
employers." Instead, the Board focused on whether the nurses' duties
required "independent judgment," interpreting the phrase to require
136
a high level of discretion beyond a "routine or clerical nature.
Based on this interpretation, the Board again concluded that charge
nurses are not supervisors in either hospital or nursing home
settings.13 7

Once more, the NLRB's broad interpretation of section 2(11)
140
has split the circuits. The Third,3 8 Fourth,139 and Sixth Circuits
have rejected the Board's interpretation of the "independent
judgment" test, holding that LPNs are supervisors within the
143
142
meaning of the NLRA.141 In contrast, the Seventh, Eighth,
independent judgment to assign tasks is a supervisor, most professionals will qualify as
supervisors).
134. See, e.g., Michelle Amber, Full Impact of High Court Ruling on Status of Nurses
Still Unclear, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 165, at D-22 (Aug. 29, 1994) (calling on the
NLRB to clarify the definition of supervisor for the health care industry); Justices Find
Nurses Who Direct Other Employees Are Supervisors,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at
D-3 (May 24, 1994) (discussing nurses' unions' fears that the decision would affect
membership in labor organizations).
135. See The NLRB and Supervisory Status, supra note 42, at 1721 (accusing the NLRB
of an institutional policy bias for its practice of adopting whatever definition of supervisor
that most broadens the scope of the NLRA).
136. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 733 (1996) (explaining that a patient
treatment plan may require professional judgment, but will not implicate independent
judgment if direction given to other employees in implementing such a plan is routine).
137. See Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 811 (1996) (finding that nurses are not
supervisors because they do not exercise independent judgment as required by the
NLRA); ProvidenceHosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 733 (same).
138. See NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs., 176 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that
LPN charge nurses exercise independent judgment under the NLRA).
139. See Beverly Enters., Va. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 298 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(holding LPNs to be supervisors); Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 345 (same).
140. See Mid-America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 1998)
(determining that nursing home LPNs met the definition of supervisor under section 2(11)
of the NLRA); Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365,370-71 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
141. LPNs often function as charge nurses. See supra note 40.
The Second Circuit has determined that tugboat and barge captains are
supervisors under the NLRA using an analysis of independent judgment similar to the
Fourth Circuit's. See Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 490-92 (2d Cir.
1997) (stating that tugboat captains exercise independent judgment and chastising the
Board for its "biased mishandling" of supervisor cases). The Spentonbush court
announced that the NLRB had forfeited the normal standard of deferential judicial review
by its manipulation of the supervisor definition and was thus subject to a "more probing"
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146
Ninth,1" and D.C. Circuits 45 have reached the opposite conclusion.
These circuits emphasize judicial deference to the Board and the
routine nature of the nurses' jobs. 47

One of the reasons for the circuit split over supervisory status is
a fundamental disagreement over the level of deference to be
accorded to the NLRB. 14' The dissension was perhaps predictable,
given the Supreme Court's ambivalent attitude towards NLRB
discretion. 149 Critics have denounced the Glenmark approach as
review than otherwise required. Id. at 492.
142. See NLRB v. GranCare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding
that nursing home LPNs are not supervisors under the NLRA).
143. See Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
charge nurses are not supervisors).
144. See Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that charge nurses are not supervisors).
145. See Beverly Enters.-Pa. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1269, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (mem.) (enforcing the Board's order determining that LPNs are not supervisors).
146. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted an approach to independent judgment similar to
the Ninth Circuit's, but has not ruled specifically on the supervisory status of nurses. See
Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999) (refusing to apply
Spentonbush/Red Star's "reduced level of deference" in upholding the Board's finding that
docking pilots exercise only routine judgment and, therefore, are not supervisors under
the NLRA).
147. See Beverly Enters.-Pa., 129 F.3d at 1270 (emphasizing that nurses' routines lack
the degree of discretion determinative of independent judgment); ProvidenceAlaska Med.
Ctr., 121 F.3d at 551-53 (finding charge nurses' duties to be more clerical in nature than
supervisory); infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text (discussing the cases' treatment of
judicial deference).
148. Compare Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 491 (2d Cir. 1997)
(ruling that the NLRB had forfeited the normal standard of deferential judicial review by
its manipulation of the supervisor definition), and NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, 690 F.2d
1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1982) (determining that because of the Board's inconsistency in
determining supervisory status, normal judicial deference is replaced by careful scrutiny of
the Board's findings and the factual record), with VIP Health Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 164
F.3d 644, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the Board's findings need "only" be supported
by substantial evidence), and Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 551
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that because of the Board's expertise in distinguishing employees
from supervisors, the normal judicial deference is heightened).
It should be noted that the Eighth Circuit has also chastised the Board for its
inconsistency in determining supervisory status and has stated that scrutiny is particularly
important in such cases. See Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir.
1992). Despite what might be seen as a less deferential standard or review, however, the
Eighth Circuit has held that charge nurses are employees rather than supervisors. See
Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that charge nurses
are not supervisors).
149. Compare Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366 (1998)
(rejecting the NLRB's standard for employer polling), with Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB,
517 U.S. 392, 399 (1996) (reminding courts that they must respect and uphold agency
decisions even when the issue might be resolved another way with nearly equal reason).
For an analysis of Allentown, see Curtis H. Allen III, Note, JudicialReview Gone Awry:
The Supreme Court Rewrites the NLRB's Unitary Standard in Allentown Mack Sales &
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failing to provide the judicial deference 5 ' due an administrative
agency.'
The Glenmark court proclaimed that, because of an
"evidentiary deficiency," the Board had presented an irrational
interpretation of the NLRA.5 2 Yet, as Judge Jones noted in dissent,
some evidence supported the Board's interpretation that the LPNs
did not practice independent judgment as envisioned by the
NLRA 5 3 The Glenmark court disregarded that evidence, however,
and reviewed the case de novo.1 4 Thus, the Glenmark decision
reinforces the growing criticism that the Fourth Circuit is not
affording the Board its due deference."
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1925, 1925-28 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has departed from the standard of review for agency decisions that it espouses).
150. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that if an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is a
"permissible construction," courts must defer to the agency); infra notes 156-61 and
accompanying text (further explaining Chevron and the proper standard of review).
151. See CooperiT. Smith, Inc., 177 F.3d at 1262 n.3, 1268 (declining to adopt
Glenmark's "reduced level of deference" toward Board decisions); Beverly Enters., Va. v.
NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 303 (4th Cir. 1999) (Phillips, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's ...
conclusion is reached by declining to accord the Board's decisions the deference normally
commanded by... Chevron, instead effectively reviewing the Board's decisions de novo,
both as to legal conclusions and factual findings."); Straight, supra note 117, at 1965-66
(arguing that cases like Glenmark unacceptably substitute the court's judgment for that of
the Board's).
152. Glenmark,147 F.3d at 345.
153. See id. at 346-47 (Jones, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 338 (announcing that careful scrutiny of the factual record is necessary in
supervisory determinations because of the Board's inconsistent application of the
statutory definition).
155. See CooperIT. Smith, Inc., 177 F.3d at 1262-63 & n.3 (criticizing the lowered
standard of review used in Glenmark and other NLRB cases); NLRB v. Attleboro,
Assocs., 176 F.3d 154, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit's reduced level
of deference standard); Beverly Enters., Va. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 304 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit failed to accord due
judicial deference to the Board's interpretation of independent judgment); Providence
Alaska Med. Ctr, v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Because the Board has
expertise 'in making the subtle and complex distinctions between supervisors and
employees,... the normal deference [we] give to the Board is particularly strong when it
makes those determinations.'" (quoting NLRB v. SRDC, Inc., 45 F.3d 328, 333 (9th Cir.
1995))); NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (Murnaghan,
J., dissenting) ("The majority ... disregards ... our limited role on appeal. An appellate
court 'may not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views ....."."
(quoting NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 435 F.2d 1208, 1209 (4th Cir. 1970) (quoting Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)))); J. Mitchell Armbruster, Note,
Deference Defiantly Denied: The Fourth CircuitRejects NLRB Position on § 8(j) Pre-hire
Agreements in Industrial TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB, 76 N.C. L. REv. 2331, 2355-59
(1998) (describing the conflict between the NLRB and the Fourth Circuit stemming from
the court's refusal to give deference to the NLRB when it conflicts with stare decisis);
Joseph A. Fazioli, Recent Case, Chevron Up in Smoke?: Tobacco at the Crossroadsof
AdministrativeLaw, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Administration,
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The Fourth Circuit's approach contrasts with the standard
announced by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc.'5 6 Chevron established a two-part
process for courts reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute. 57
Initially, the court must decide whether the statute plainly and

specifically speaks to the precise issue at hand.'58 If the statute passes
this "plain meaning" test, the court is free to disregard the
interpretation because the express will of Congress, whose
paramount, is clear. 15 9 If, however, the statute is ambiguous
as to the issue at hand, the court must decide whether the

agency's
intent is
or silent
agency's

interpretation is a "permissible construction" of the statute. 60 If the
construction is a reasonable one, and therefore permissible, the court

must defer to the agency's interpretation. 6'

Thus, in applying the Chevron principle to determine if nurses

exercise "independent judgment" under section 2(11) of the Act,
courts should first consider whether the phrase is ambiguous. If the
phrase is unambiguous and, thus, clearly reflects Congress's intent on
the precise issue of supervisory status, a court need not defer to the
Board's interpretation. 6 2 If the language is unclear, the court must

defer to the Board's interpretation if it is a reasonable one. Although
the Glenmark court insisted that the "independent judgment"

language of section 2(11) is "plain,"'163 the Supreme Court specifically
noted in Health Care that the language is ambiguous. 64 The current
153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1057, 1067-80 (1999) (criticizing
the Fourth Circuit's failure to follow Chevron and to defer to agency interpretation).
156. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Before Chevron, courts applied varying standards of review
to agency decisions. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 83, 87-94 (1994).
157. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
158. See id. at 842-43.
159. See id. at 842-43 & n.9.
160. Id. at 843. A construction is permissible if it is reasonable. See id. at 845.
161. Id. at 843, 845. The Fourth Circuit, however, has selectively ignored Chevron,
especially when deference to agency decisions conflicts with the principle of stare decisis.
See Armbruster, supra note 155, at 2359 (predicting that the Fourth Circuit's refusal to
defer to the NLRB in Industrial TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254-56 (4th
Cir. 1997), and the Board's refusal to defer to the Fourth Circuit will lead to inconsistent
nationwide application of collective bargaining statutes as well as an increase in conflicts
between the Fourth Circuit and administrative agencies).
162. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9. The Supreme Court's decision in Health Care
illustrates this principle: because the Court found the "in the interest of the employer"
language to be unambiguous, it declined to defer to the Board's interpretation. NLRB v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 579 (1994).
163. Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 340.
164. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 579 (agreeing with the NLRB that section 2(11)'s
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circuit split over the interpretation of "independent judgment"'6 also
suggests that the phrase's meaning is not clear. 166 If the language is
ambiguous, the Fourth Circuit has overreached its boundaries by
ignoring the Chevron judicial deference standard.1 67 Although the
Supreme Court rejected the Board's original construction of the Act
in Health Care, the "independent judgment" analysis is more factdriven and subjective than the "in the interest of the employer"
6
language and, thus, should be subject to judicial deference. '
Because of the differing standards of review, judges in different
circuits are examining identical facts and reaching opposite
conclusions. 169 For example, some courts have found that LPNs
"independent judgment" language is ambiguous). Two circuits have specifically relied
upon this language from Health Care in determining that they should defer to the Board's
recent rulings on nurses' status. See VIP Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 164 F.3d 644, 648
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548,552 (9th Cir. 1997).
165. Compare Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 340 (concluding that nurses "share the power of
management in the manner contemplated by the plain language of § 2(11)"), with
Providence Alaska Med. Ctr., 121 F.3d at 555 (holding the language of section 2(11) to be
elusive). Even among Board members, there is disagreement on this point. See Nymed,
Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1996) (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting) (arguing that the
Board had stretched the plain language of section 2(11)).
166. That is, the fact that reasonable minds are interpreting "independent judgment" in
different ways indicates that the language is not as plain as the Fourth Circuit claims it to
be. See NLRB v. GranCare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
term's ambiguity entitled it to Chevron deference); VIP HealthServs., Inc., 164 F.3d at 648
(stating that "independent judgment" is an ambiguous phrase); Providence Alaska Med.
Ctr., 121 F.3d at 552 (noting that the "independent judgment" language is ambiguous). In
contract law, the plain meaning rule is inapplicable to ambiguous terms. See Carlton J.
Snow, Contract Interpretation: The Plain Meaning Rule in Labor Arbitration, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 682 & n.4 (1987).
167. See Armbruster, supra note 155, at 2353.
168. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 579 (agreeing that because the phrase "independent
judgment" is ambiguous, the courts must give the Board "ample room" to apply the
language to different categories of employees). But see Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d
365, 371 (6th Cir. 1997) (warning that the fact-intensive nature of supervisory-status cases
will not permit the NLRB to use "razor-thin factual distinctions" to engender protected
status for nurses).
169. Even within the circuits, judges are deeply divided over independent judgment.
See NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs., 176 F.3d 154,169-70 (3d Cir. 1999) (Bright, J., dissenting)
(stating that LPNs do not exercise sufficient independent judgment to qualify as
supervisors); Beverly Enters., Va. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 303 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(Phillips, J., dissenting) (arguing that an LPN charge nurse is not a supervisor under
section 2(11)); Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 345 (Jones, J., dissenting) (arguing that LPNs do not
use independent judgment within the meaning of the Act); Providence Alaska Med. Ctr.,
121 F.3d at 556 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (contending that nurses are supervisors under
section 2(11)). Board members also consistently disagree with fellow members on this
issue. See Frontier of Conn., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 1997-1998 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
16,604, 16,605 (Aug. 12, 1998) (Brame, Board Member, dissenting) (arguing that the
NLRB should review "factual issues" to determine whether nurses are supervisors under
the Act); Nymed, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1996) (Cohen, Board Member, dissenting)
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exercise independent judgment because they can submit reprimand
reports. 17 Other courts have found that LPNs do not exercise
independent judgment because the only disciplinary action they can
take is to file such reports. 171 The pattern has been repeated with
other aspects of the nurses' duties, including on-site authority, 72
emergency procedures, 73 and patient care. 174
Furthermore, although appeals courts agree that the LPNs'
exercise of discretion plays a key role in determining supervisory
status, 75 they differ in their analyses regarding such discretion. The
Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that LPNs display independent
judgment because of the amount of discretion LPNs exercise within
their normal routine, even if their routine entails repetitive, standard
procedures. 76 According to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, however,
(contending that the Board had reached its decision by stretching the language of section
2(11)).
170. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 344 (stating that filing the reports is a disciplinary
action requiring independent judgment); Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 370 (6th
Cir. 1997) (holding that disciplinary forms required "sensitive and nuanced judgment"
implicating statutory language).
171. See VIP Health Servs., Inc., v. NLRB, 164 F.3d 644, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[M]ere
reporting is insufficient to establish that the nurses effectively recommend discharge or
discipline."); Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 346 (Jones, J., dissenting) (noting that a nurse's
discretion is constrained by the ineffectual correction reports).
172. Compare VIP Health Servs., 164 F.3d at 649-50 (stating that the absence of
supervisory authority on site does not automatically confer such authority upon the
highest ranking employees on site), and NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1467 (7th
Cir. 1983) (reasoning that simply because the LPNs may be the highest ranking employees
on site "does not ipso facto make them supervisors"), with Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 344-45
(noting that when the Director of Nursing is absent, the employees must look to the
charge nurse for direction, indicating supervisory authority).
173. CompareAttleboro Assocs., 176 F.3d at 167 (stating that the charge nurse's ability
to call in extra staff in case of an emergency illustrates her authority to use independent
judgment), with Providence Alaska Med. Ctr., 121 F.3d at 552-54 (holding that charge
nurses who work in the emergency services center follow a routine and do not exercise
independent judgment).
174. Compare Caremore,Inc., 129 F.3d at 369 (indicating that LPNs' ability to direct
aides regarding patient care evidenced their use of independent judgment), with Beverly
Enters.-Pa. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1269, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (maintaining that, because
patient care activities are repetitive, the LPNs fail to exercise "anything even resembling
supervisory authority").
175. See, e.g., Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 346 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is ultimately the
degree of discretion exercised by the individual that controls whether they are an
employee or a supervisor."); Beverly Enters.-Pa., 129 F.3d at 1270 ("[T]he question of
independent judgment under section 2(11) is one of the degree of discretion exercised with
respect to the statutory indicia of supervisory status.").
176. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 341-42 (concluding that nurses used independent
judgment in the established procedure); Caremore, Inc., 129 F.3d at 370 (concluding that
completing standard evaluation forms, although routine, nevertheless indicates
independent judgment by nurses).
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LPNs do not exercise independent judgment within a routine
precisely because the work is repetitive. 77 Such dissension over
"independent judgment" and the fact-based analyses of nursing
duties probably will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court or
Congress. 78

If the Supreme Court were to address the supervisory status of
licensed practical nurses again,

9

the Board's position would be

stronger than it was in Health Care80 The Supreme Court has
already admitted that the "independent judgment" language is
ambiguous,' 8' and, given the fact-specific analyses used to determine
whether particular employees exercise such judgment, the Court has
ample room to provide guidance on the issue raised in Glenmark
without overturning Health Care. The Supreme Court's fundamental
contention in Health Care was that the Board attempted to
"shoehorn" nurses into the statutory definition by using a strained
and unacceptable interpretation of the "ordinary meaning" of the
NLRA1m This concern would probably not reappear as a key factor
in an "independent judgment" analysis, however, because the Court
has already acknowledged the language's ambiguity.la 3 According to
the dictates of Chevron, the Court would need to determine only
whether the Board's construction of the statute isi reasonable
because
4
the "independent judgment" language is unclear.'
177. See Providence Alaska Med. Cr., 121 F.3d at 552-53 (holding that an LPN's
assignment of duties to lower employees does not involve independent judgment because
it is "within the parameters" of the monthly assignment schedule); Beverly Enters.-Pa.,129
F.3d at 1270 (holding that, if an exercise of authority is routine, it does not involve
independent judgment).
178. For a context-based analysis, see The NLRB and Supervisory Status, supra note
42, at 1718-27 (detailing the complexities and potential motivations behind supervisory
status determinations).
179. The Supreme Court's criteria for granting certiorari include the existence of a
conflict between the circuit courts of appeals. See SUP. Cr. R. 10.
180. The Supreme Court in Health Care noted several times that the Board relied
exclusively on its interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" in arguing against
supervisory status for LPNs, hinting broadly that an alternative argument based on more
ambiguous language may have succeeded where the patient care analysis failed. NLRB v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,579, 583-84 (1994) (admitting that
"independent judgment" is ambiguous but irrelevant because the Board had failed to
argue its significance, and noting that, if the question of nurses as supervisors had been
presented under a "proper test," the Court would have spent more time examining the
evidence).
181. See id. at 579.
182. Id. at 583.
183. See id. at 579.
184. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984); supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text (discussing the dictates of
Chevron).
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Revisiting the issue of supervisory status for nurses would give

the Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify its position on proper
judicial deference toward Board interpretations. 8 ' The NLRA
explicitly authorizes the Board to define collective bargaining units,'86

and it should be afforded adequate discretion to do so. 187 Because of
its vast experience in distinguishing the complexities and subtleties of

the employer-employee relationship, the Board is uniquely qualified
to resolve textual ambiguities in the statute in a manner consistent
with the various purposes of the Act. 188 The Supreme Court should

recognize and support that expertise and reaffirm the judicial
deference toward the Board that it is due under Chevron 8 9

If the Court adheres to Chevron, there is solid support from
several circuits holding that the Board's interpretation of
"independent judgment" is rational under the NLRA. 90 Legislative
history also provides support for the right of licensed practical nurses
to unionize. 191 LPNs, who may only oversee a facility for a few hours

a week and who otherwise are under the direction of registered
nurses, do not seem to share the same power of management as the

foremen who were the focus of congressional debate over excluding
supervisors from the NLRA.

92

Indeed, there is evidence that

Congress specifically intended that nurses be protected under the
185. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
apparent ambivalence regarding judicial deference).
186. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994).
187. See Michael C. Harper, The Case for Limiting Judicial Review of Labor Board
Certification Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 262, 294-95 (1987) (explaining that
Congress created the Board to resolve labor dilemmas because of its dissatisfaction with
judicial law-making in the area of labor law and that Congress entrusted the Board with
wide discretion).
188. See id. at 294-300 (arguing that the Board is far better suited than the judiciary to
make certification decisions).
189. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron).
190. Besides the declared ambiguity of the language, the Board may point to the
decisions by the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits upholding the Board's
interpretation. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (listing the circuit decisions
which affirmed the Board's analysis as reasonable under the NLRA). It should be
remembered as well that the Supreme Court's rejection of the Board's interpretation in
Health Care was approved by the narrowest of margins. NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 572 (1994) (reversing the Board's ruling by a fiveto-four decision).
191. The Court discounted the legislative history that supports nurses' rights to
unionize in Health Care, but it might be more persuasive when combined with a
reasonable interpretation of the NLRA. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 581-82.
192. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 80-510, at 35 (1947) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/8:H.Rpt.80510) (relating that supervisors should be limited to foremen and persons of higher rank, as
opposed to minor supervisory employees); supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text
(describing the history of the NLRA).
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Act. 190 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should rule that licensed

practical nurses are not supervisors under the NLRA because they do
not exercise the discretion necessary to meet the "independent
judgment" standard.
Another possible approach to the LPNs' dilemma is to seek
legislative action. A long-term health care system in which nursing
homes play an increasingly significant role has taken on increased
importance as the Baby Boom generation ages. 94 The health care
industry as a whole is expanding and will likely grow further as the
number of elderly Americans sharply rises in coming decades. 195 The
workers employed by the health care industry are fundamental to this
growth. 9 Nurses are increasingly unionizing in order to improve
193. See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 11 (1947) (Sup. Does. No. Y1.1/5:S.Rpt.80/105) (stating
that, although Congress had not given nurses' special problems of professional status
recognition in the past, nurses employed at manufacturing corporations and other nontraditional settings have a great interest in maintaining professional standards and, thus,
should be included under the definition of "professional" with the option of maintaining a
bargaining unit separate from less-skilled employees). Congress had no reason to consider
protecting nurses working in hospitals or nursing homes when it originally amended the
NLRA because these facilities did not fall under the Act until it was amended in 1974. Cf.
Straight, supra note 117, at 1930-34, 1938. (describing the legislative history of the NLRA
and the 1974 amendments to the Act). When the Act was amended to cover all health
care facilities, Congress declined to specifically protect nurses, but noted with approval the
Board's handling of cases involving the supervisory status of health care professionals. See
S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974) (Sup. Docs. No. Yl.1/5:S.Rpt.93/766) (encouraging the
Board's continued distinction of health care professionals whose direction of other
employees is incidental to professional judgment).
194. Researchers project that of the persons who reached 65 in 1990, 43% will be
admitted to a nursing home before they die. See Kemper & Murtaugh, supra note 15, at
597.
195. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 17 (estimating that the U.S.
elderly population will more than double between 2020 and 2050).
196. Doctors, like nurses, are attempting to unionize in the face of increasing power
held by health maintenance organizations and managed care plans. See Jeremy Lutsky, Is
Your Physician Becoming a Teamster: The Rising Trend of Physicians Joining Labor
Unions in the Late 1990s, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 55, 64-87 (1997) (tracing the rise
and legal challenges to physicians joining unions); see also Thomas-Davis Med. Ctrs. v.
NLRB, 157 F.3d 909, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming a Board finding that doctors were not
supervisors under section 2(11)). Physicians who are employed by health care providers in
a staff physician capacity may organize for collective bargaining purposes, but most
doctors are independent contractors and thus may not organize. See Francis J. Serbaroli,
When Physicians Try to Unionize Against HMOs, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1998, at 3.
From a public policy standpoint, it appears anomalous that nurses may not
unionize in some circuits when doctors are allowed to do so. Looking at the statutory
language, however, it is clear that most doctors do not reach the first prong of the test
because they do not perform any of the enumerated tasks as contemplated by section
2(11). Furthermore, the ability of one group to unionize should, from a legal standpoint,
not affect another group's classification as either employee or supervisor. Nevertheless,
the discrepancy between nurses and doctors remains an inconsistency that Congress
should address.
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patient welfare in the face of monetary cutbacks by managed care
companies.' 7 Currently, there is a loud call for nursing home
reform 8 that may force Congress to address the special needs of
health care professionals by specifically amending the Act to protect
RNs and LPNs. 199 Legislative reform would have a major advantage
over judicial resolution because specifically protecting RNs and LPNs

under the NLRA could help to end the judicial wrangling over the
subject once and for all.
In contrast, a Supreme Court decision upholding the Board's
interpretation of "independent judgment" probably would provide
more narrow protection for nurses than a congressional edict. For
example, if the Court ruled that LPNs who function only occasionally
as charge nurses do not exercise independent judgment within the
meaning of the Act, many questions would remain unanswered. The
circuit courts might split again over the status of RNs and of LPNs
who work frequently as charge nurses.

Additional legal wrangling would be even more likely if the
Court rejected the Board's interpretation of "independent judgment"
197. See Eggleston, supra note 7, at 929-42 (arguing that health maintenance
organizations sacrifice patient care for financial reasons and outlining nurses' attempts to
combat the declining standards by organizing); More Nurses Join Unions to Address
Patient Care, NEwS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 24, 1999, at 13A (describing the
nurses' attempts to improve patient care by gaining more bargaining power through
unionization).
198. See Lorraine Adams, The Hazardsof Elder Care; Overexertion,Assault Put Aides
at High Risk for Injury, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at Al (outlining nursing reform
advocates' attempts to minimize resident-to-staff ratios); Robert Salladay, Davis Vetoes
Overhaul of Elderly Care Laws, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 11, 1999, at A4, available in 1999
WL 6878451 (reporting the California governor's veto of nursing home reform, despite
overwhelming legislative and popular support for the reform); see also S. 1445, 106th
Cong. (1999) (proposing a Patient Abuse Prevention Act that would require employee
background checks at nursing homes to prevent abuse of residents).
199. See H.R. 4277, 105th Cong. (1998) (proposing greater protection for nurses and
doctors to unionize). Part of the problem facing the courts and the Board is that the
NLRA no longer fits in with modern employment practices. When the Act was written in
1935, Congress was thinking in terms of foremen and traditional laborers. See Cox ET
AL., supra note 7, at 237. New types of management with decentralized power structures
and front-line management empowerment make it increasingly difficult for the Board and
the courts to mold the Act to fit certain situations. See Peter R. McLeod, 1995-96 Annual
Survey of Labor and Employment Law, Status of Nurses as "Supervisors" Under the
National Labor Relations Act Nymed, Inc., 38 B.C. L. REV. 323, 334 (1997). For
example, many health maintenance organizations are restructuring traditional nursing
staff hierarchies by placing nurses and caregivers into "patient care teams." Eggleston,
supra note 7, at 939-40 n.49. Such restructuring drastically reduces the number of
registered nurses, thereby reducing costs. This "team approach" makes it difficult to draw
a clear line between supervisors and employees, because a licensed practical nurse may
participate equally in patient care. Congress should clarify the matter by addressing the
Act's increasing impotence.
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and the Board decided to return to the first prong of the NLRA
supervisor test to argue that nurses are not supervisors. 211 The
Court's opinion in Health Care seemed to invite this argument,
suggesting that the Board examine nurses' professional duties to
determine whether they perform any of the listed activities in a
manner that makes them supervisors. 0 ' The Court noted that such
an inquiry would be "part of the Board's routine and proper
adjudicative function,"2' but warned the Board not to interpret
phrases in such a way that defies the ordinary meaning of the
statute. 203
Since Health Care, several circuits have accepted the Board's
argument that nurses' duties do not fall within the twelve enumerated
tasks,2 4 although the only courts to do so have been the ones that
held nurses are not supervisors under the "independent judgment"
test.2 5 Given the close scrutiny, if not outright hostility, that the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits apply to the Board's decisions, it is
doubtful that the Board would succeed in arguing that nurses do not
"discipline" or "assign" other employees under the Act.20 6 The nowfamiliar cycle of circuit court dissension would be repeated yet
again.207
200. See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text (addressing the Board's options if
their interpretation of independent judgment were to be rejected).
201. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 582-83
(1994).
202. Id. at 582.
203. See id. at 583. The Fourth Circuit echoed this sentiment in Glenmark. 147 F.3d at
339 n.8 (criticizing the Board for its attempt to "modify the plain language of § 2(11)").
204. See VIP Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 164 F.3d 644, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding
that nurses did not assign or discipline employees under section 2(11)); Providence Alaska
Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the nurses did not
"responsibly direct" other employees).
205. See, e.g., VIP Health Servs., Inc., 164 F.3d at 647-50; Providence Alaska Med. Ctr.,
121 F.3d at 552-55.
206. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 340 n.8 (stating that the Board's obsession with its
policy goals has resulted in a "troubling pattern" of disregard for circuit precedent);
Caremore,Inc., 129 F.3d at 371 (declaring that the Board misapprehends both the law and
its own place in the legal system).
207. To succeed, the Board would have to be particularly careful not to stretch the
language of the Act. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 583 (recommending that the Board
adhere to the "ordinary meaning of the language"); Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 339-40 n.8
(disapproving of the Board's attempt to modify the plain language of the NLRA);
Caremore, Inc., 129 F.3d at 371 (warning the Board that "razor-thin" factual distinctions
cannot serve as a basis for interpreting the NLRA). The Board's failure to argue that
nurses do not meet the first prong of the supervisor test in the past, however, may
condemn it in the future, as precedent now exists that creates a low threshold for defining
duties as one of the enumerated activities. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 341 (holding that
minimal exercise of duties constitutes "assignment" under the Act).
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Until the Supreme Court or Congress addresses the issue,
Glenmark definitively rejects the NLRB's interpretation of

"independent judgment," at least for LPNs with any supervisory
capability °8 Any future attempts to unionize health care workers
within the Fourth Circuit probably will be challenged by health care

management companies on the basis of Glenmark. Given the court's
low opinion of the Board, it is unlikely that the health care workers

would prevail. 9 Consequently, while LPNs who work as charge
nurses in Washington, D.C., where the D.C. Circuit has held them to
be employees, may unionize, it appears that LPNs employed in
identical jobs across the Potomac River in Virginia, within the Fourth
Circuit, may not be able to bargain collectively.
Glenmark is one of the Fourth Circuit's latest skirmishes over
the Board's policy push for a broad reading of section 2(11). By
denying nurses the right to unionize despite changes in the
population and the industry that are redefining health care worker
roles, the Fourth Circuit's decision demonstrates the need for
208. See Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 335. Registered nurses, who have even greater
supervisory capacity than LPNs, would also be excluded. It is unclear whether LPNs who
never act as charge nurses would be deemed to be employees or supervisors by the Fourth
Circuit, but the Glenmark opinion appears to categorize LPNs who exercise any of the
enumerated tasks of section 2(11) as supervisors, regardless of whether they act as charge
nurses. See id. at 342 (noting that the LPNs' ability to assign tasks while utilizing
independent judgment is sufficient to establish supervisory status).
209. Glenmark is only one example of the Fourth Circuit's growing hostility to what it
perceives as the Board's apparent indifference to circuit precedent. See Case Farms of
N.C., Inc. v. NLRB, 128 F.3d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1997) (Williams, J., concurring) (expressing
"concern with the Board's apparent disregard for the decisions of the Circuit Courts"); BiLo Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268, 273 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Board did not
analyze the facts in the case properly, given circuit precedent); NLRB v. D&D Enters.,
125 F.3d 200, 206 (4th Cir. 1997) (declining to enforce an unfair labor practice order
because the Board did not follow circuit precedent); Performance Friction Corp. v.
NLRB, 117 F.3d 763, 768 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Board's order requiring an
employer to rescind a disciplinary policy and rehire all workers terminated under that
policy overstepped the Board's remedial authority); Industrial TurnAround Corp. v.
NLRB, 115 F.3d 248,253-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the NLRB analyzed a case arising
in the Fourth Circuit under its own law, rather than circuit precedent).
Remarking upon the hostility, one Fourth Circuit judge recently predicted that
"[o]nly uncontrollable mischief can result from courts presuming, on the basis of some
perceived policy bias in a course of agency decisions, to confer a general pariah status
upon that agency." Beverly Enters., Va. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 290, 307 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
The Sixth Circuit also has expressed its ire with the Board, complaining that the
NLRB "continues to misapprehend both the law and its own place in the legal system."
Caremore, Inc., 129 F.3d at 371. The Second Circuit has also warned that "the Board's
biased mishandling of cases involving supervisors increasingly has called into question our
obeisance to the Board's decisions in this area." Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB,
106 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir. 1997).
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congressional or Supreme Court action to protect nurses under the
NLRA. Until the Supreme Court addresses the issue or legislative
amendment takes place, however, the Fourth Circuit is now in a
minority that prohibits charge nurses from joining a union.
JENNIFER CLAIRE LEISTEN

